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On Boyd's Rebuttal of Kripke's Argument for Dualism
Klaus Ladstaetter
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Abstract
The essay pre-sents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests) My
claim, inspiied by Richard Boyd, is thit even if one of Kripke's central suppositions - the principle of necessity bf identities using
rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke's dualism.
Introduction
The plan for the essay is first to present Kripke's argument
for mindibody-dualism dnd to make the suppositions ex-
plicit on which it rests. Second, traditionalidentity theory is
distinguished from non-traditional identity theory, if only to
set aside further discussion of traditional identity theory.
My claim is that even if one of Kripke's centralsuppositions
- : the principle of necessity of identities using igid designa-
.,,-,'fiirs - is accepted by the non-traditionalidentity theorist, it
' ,' is still possible for her io rebut Kripke's dualism. The third
's5'ction 
expounds the non-fraditional identity theorist's
possible appeal to an analogy in order to explaiin the rela-
tion between mental phenomena (e.9. pain) and physical
phenomena (e.9. C-fiber stimulation), while section four
reconstructs Kripke's attack on th'is analogy. Refuting
Kripke's attack in light of Boyd's proposals in section five, I
conclude that non-traditionalidentity theory is viable. !
1. Kripke's Argument for Mind/Body-
Dualism
Kripke (1980) wants to defend some form of dualism (with-
out defending Cartesian substance dualism though). In
order to do so, he uses the Cadesian lntuition, i.e. the in-
tuition that it is possible that the mind exist witho.ut the
body and that it is possible that the body exist without the
mind. In other words, Kripke deems it possible that there
be disembodied minds (or "pure souls") and that there be
"disminded" bodies (or "zombies"); either way - it is possi-
ble that the mind is different from the body, schematically
represented by:
o ( A + B ) l
Due to his conception of names as rigid designators,
Kripke is committed to what he calls the principle of neces-
sity of identities using rigid designators (cf. Kripke 1980,
e.g. p.146). Henceforth, I  shal lcal l this principle (PNIRD):
( A = B ) - + t r ( A = B ) 2
Notice that the logically equivalent contrapositive of this
'principle is:
0 ( A + B ) + ( A # B ) 3
1 As it is common, I use the symbol 'f as abbreviation of the sentential opera-
tor "it is possible thaf and ihe symbol 'D' as abbreviation of the phrase 'it is
necessary that". Kripke insists that he is concemed with meiaphysical modali-
ties (cf. Kripke 1980, e.g. p.35); his view will not be challenged here.
2 For what follows, the reader should take the letter "A' as a place holder for a
name of a mental phenomenon (e.9. pain), and the lefter'B' as a place holder
ior a name of a physical phenomenon (e.9. C-fiber stimulation).
3 For the sake of the argument, l'll suppose that (PNIRD) and its equivalent
contrapositive are true. I shall thus put aside the obvious objection to lhe con-
traposiiive that possibility does not imply actuality'
Kripke argues that the Cartesian lntuition taken together
with the (PNIRD) entails the view that mental phenomena
are actLally different from physical phenomena; here's the
reconstruction of his argument:
( 1 )  o ( A # B ) Caftesian Intuition
(2) (A = B) + tr (A = B) (PNIRD)
(3) 0 (A * B) -+ (A # B) from 2, by contraposition
( 4 )  A * B from 1,3, by modus ponens
2. Mind/Body-ldentity Theory
ln order to characterize identity theory, it is advisable to
disting uish between traditional and non-traditional identity
theory. A traditional identity theorisl (whether type or to-
ken) rejects the (PNIRD) and thus accepts its negation:
-((A = B) -+ ! (A = B))
which is logically equivalent to:
( A = B ) & - n ( A = B ; a  :
The traditional identity theorist thus claims (in the first qon-
junct) that, as a matter of fact about the actual world, it is
true that pain is identical with C-fiber stimulation, but -
when sharing the Cadeslan lntuition (in the second con-
junct) - the theorist adds that this is not necessarily true; it
is possibly false because we can imagine a world in which
pain exists without there being any C-fiber stimulation (e.9.
in "pure souls") and because we can imagine a world in
which C-fibgr stimulation exists without there being any
pain (e.9. in "2ombies").
Kripke thinks that traditional identity theory is simply
false because it is committed to an incorrect conception gf
names as non-rigid designators. I shall share Kripke's
supposition of names as rigid designators and of the
(PNIRD) throughout this essay; so I shall set aside further
discussion o'f traditional identity theory here. The goal of
the essay rather is to show that even ff an identity theorist
shares Kripke's supposition, it is possible for her to rebut
Kripke's dual ism.
Non-traditional identity theory (whether type or token)
accepts the concepiion of names as rigid designators and
the (PNIRD) and is thus committed to the argument:
( 1 )  A = B I dentity Theorist's I ntu ition
(2) (A = B) + tr (A = B) (PNIRD)
( 3 )  D (A=B)5 from 1 ,2, by modus ponens
4 This claim is in tum logically equivalent to: (A = B) & 0 (A * B)
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Now, the non-traditional identity theorist cannot attack the
validity of Kripke's argument from the Cartesian lntuition
and the (PNIRD). So she must, in an effort to establisfr that
his argument is unsound, rather attack the Carfesian Intui-
fion itself (i.e. the negation of the conclusion of her own
argument) - by showing, for instance, that it is impossible
that pain be different from C-fiber stimulation.
3. The Non-Traditionalldentity Theorist's
Analogy
The non-traditionalidentity theorist (henceforth , the identity
theorist) wants to hold:
A = B
but cannot at the same time hold:
o ( A r B )
For the latter claim contradicts the conclusion of her own
argument, and the conjunctioh of both claims entails that
the identity statement is merely contingent (which would
render her a traditional identity theorist). lnstead, the iden-
tity theorist must hold:
.  - o ( A # B )
The challenge for her, then, is to say why the above iden-
tity statement is only seemingly contingent. The identity
thearist must thus explain away its apparent contingency.
ln particular, she must explain why it is only apparently
possible that pain not be identicalwith C-fiber stimulation,
while it is in fact impossible.
,Kripke thinks that the identity theorist cannot meet this
challenge. ln his view, she fails to explain away the appar-
ent contingency of the identity statement - even if the iden-
tity theorisit employs the following analogy and claims:
(1A) The situation regarding the statement "pain = C-
fiber stimulation" is just like the situation regard-
ing the statement "water = H2O".
(2,A) Also the statement:
Water = HzO
has frequently been deemed merely a contingent
trutl'r, but - due to Kripke's work - it has^turned out
to be a necessary truth.
(3A) The explanation why this statement has fre-
quently been seen merely as a contingent ruth is that
there has been a tendency to mistake it for the state-
ment:
. The phenomenon felt as water = HzO6
(4A) Now, this statement is admittedly merely contin-
gently true, i.e. it is true in the actualworld, but:
(a) it is possible that the phenomenon felt as
water exist without the presence of HzO, i,e.
water (e.9. on Twin-Earth); and
(b) it is possible that H2O, i.e. water, exist
' without the presence of the phenomenon felt
as water (e.9. in a world inhabited by alien
creatures who have entirely different sensations
produced by H2O).
5 Notice that this claim is logically equivalent to: -0 (A * B) and thus to the
negation of the Carfesian lntuition.
6 Altematively The phenomenon that produces the sensation we call 'the
sensation of water" = H2O.
176
.: (5A) And the situation is analogous for the statement
. "pain = C-fiber'stimulation".
4. Kripke's Attack on the AnalogY
Kripke thinks that the identity theorist cannot employ
above line of reasoning because, per the analogy,
identity theoristwould be committed to claim:
(28) Also the statement:
Pain = C-fiber stimulation
has frequently been deemed merely a contingent
truth, but - upon reflectiori - it has turned out to be
a necessary truth.
(38) The explanation why this statemeni has fre-
quently been seen merely as a contingent ruth is
that there has been a tendency to mistake it for
the statement:
The phenomenon felt as psifl = C-fiber
stimulation'
But it is precisely at tfis point where the analogy breaks
down for Kripke. For the identity theorist cannot continue
to argue:
(4B) Now, this statement is admittedly merely contin-
gently true, i.e. it is true in the actualworld, but:
(a) it is possible that the phenomenon felt as
pain exist without the presence of C-fiber
stimulation, i.e. pain (e.9. in "pure souls");
and
(b) it is possible that C-fiber stimulation, i.e.
pain, exist without the presence of the phe-
nomenon felt as pain (e.9. in "zombies").
The identity theorist's appeal to this analogy is not viable
for Kripke, because he thinks that there is no possible
world in which the phenomenon felt as pain is different
from pain - thug rendering the statement:
The phenomenon felt as pain = pain
a necessary truths, while he also thinks that there is a pos-
sible world in which the phenomenon felt as water is differ-
ent from water - thus rendering the statement:
Thephenomenon felt as water = water
merely a contingent truth (even though "water = HzO" is a
necessary truth).
Kripke therefore believes that the identity theorist cannot
explain aWay the apparent contingency of the statement
"pain = C-fiber stimulation" by appeal to the analogy. The
identity theorist consequently has to bite the butlet and to
accept the Cartesian lntuition:
o ( A # B )
But from this premise, together with (PNIRD), it immedi-
ately follows that:
A # B
And so Kripke concludes that some form of dualism is true,
while identity theory is false.
7 Alternatively: The phenomenon that produces the sensation we call "the
sensation of pain" = C-fiber stimulation.
8 Notice that for Kripke, then, there is a definite description that is a rigid des-
ignator.
the
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5. The ldentity Theorist's Rebuttal
Boyd (1980, cf. p.83ff.) attempts to refute Kripke's attack
on the analogy by arguing from the identiU fheor'sf's point
of view as follows:
(1C) The situation regarding the statement "pain = C-
fiber stimulation" is exactly like the situation re-
garding the statement "water = HzO".
(2C) The statement:
Water = HzO I
is - due to Kripke's work - indeed a necessary
truth.
(3C) But the explanation why this statement has fre-
"quently been seen merely as a contingent ruth is
rather that there has been a tendency to mistake
it for the statement:
Water = the phenomenon identified as HzO
by standard tests available in the actual
world s
(4C) Now, this statement is admittedly merely contin-
gently true, i.e. it is true in the actualworld, but:
(a) it is possible that water exist without the
presence of standard tests available in the
actualworld to identify the phenomenon as
H2O; and
(b) it is possible that standard tests available in
the actualworld to identify the phenomenon
as H2O exist without the presence of water.
(5C) And this situation is precisely analogous for the
statement "pain = C-fiber stimulation".
For, per Boyd, the analogy expands as follows:
(2D) True, the statement:
Pain = C-fiber-stim ulation.
is a necessary truth.
(3D) However, the explanation why this statement has
frequently been seen merely as a contingent ruth
is that there has been a tendency to mistake it for
the statement:
Pain = the phenomenon identified as C-
fiber stimulation bv standard tests available
in the actual wqrld. lo
(4D) Now, this statement"is admittedly merely contin-
gently true, i.e. it is true in the actualworld, but:
(a) it is possible that pain exist without the pres-
ence of standard tests available in the actual
world to identify the phenomenon as C-fiber
stimulation; and
(b) it is possible that standard tests available in
the actualworld to identify the phenomenon
as G-fiber stimulation exist without the pres-
ence of pain.
The identity theorist's appeal to this analogy is viable for
Boyd, because he thinks that there is a possible world in
which the phenomenon identified as C-fiber-stimulation by
standard tests available in the actual world is different from
pain and because he also thinks that there is a possible
9 Alternatively: Water = the liquid that 
_ 
(where a description of standard
tests to identify water in the actual wodd goes into the blank).
'10 Alternatively: Pain = the phenomenon that (where a description of
standard tests to identify C-fiber stimulation in the actual world goes inio the
blank).
world in which the phenomenon identified as H2O by stan-
'dard tests available in the actual world is different from
water. Boyd thus thinks that both the statement:
Pain = the phenomenon identified as C-fiber-stimulation
by standard tests available in the actualworld
and the statement:
Water = ihe phenomenon identified as HzO by standard
tests available in the actualworld
are merely contingent and not necessa.ry truths (even
though "water = HzO" and "pain = C*fiber stimulation" are
both necessary truths)
Conclusion '
I agree with Boyd that the identity theori$t can explain
awa! the merely apparent contingency of the statement I
"p?ifl = C-fiber stimulation". \l/hile Kripke focuses on the
. 
left-hand sides of the identity statements "water = HzO"
' 
and "pain = G-fiber.stimulation" and replaces them with
mentalistic definite descriptions of the form "the phenome-
non felt as 
_" in order to establish the alleged disanal-
ogy, Boyd focuses on the right-hand sides of the identity
,statements and replaces thgm with physicalistic definite
descriptions of the form "the phenomenon identified as 
_
by standard tests available in the actual world" in order to
establish the analogy.
And Boyd is right. Water is not identical with the phe-.
nomenon felt as water; rather it is identical with the phe-
nomenon identified as HzO by standard tests available in
the actual world. Likewise, pain is not identical with the
phenomenon felt as pain; rather it is identicalwith the phe-
nomenon identified as C-fiber stimulation by standard tests
available in the actualworld.
Hence, the identity theorist can hold that the case of pain
being identical with C-fiber stirnulation is just like other
cases of identity, e.g. that of water being identical with
)zO, or that of heat being identical with mean molecular n _ r e
I energy, etc. The theorist can thus reject the Cartesian /n- I Kr n&ft6
tuition and accept its negation:
- 0 ( A t B )
in which cgge_ftn{ she does-not have. to accept Kripk6's H L9
conclusion that some form of dualism is true. lnstead, the
identity theorist can maintain that materialism (preferably
some form of non-reductive token materialism) is true, and
she can at the-same time commit herself to the (PNIRG).
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